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HYSTERIA TRUMPS FIRST AMENDMENT:
BALANCING STUDENT SPEECH WITH SCHOOL
SAFETY

I. INTRODUCTION
On April 5, 2000, Michael Demers was a 15-year-old eighth grader
enrolled in Northwest School, Leominster, Massachusetts.' Mrs. Roselli,
Michael's English teacher, ordered Michael to leave the classroom when
he continued to talk after being told to stop talking to the other students. 2
Michael went to a classroom next door, where another teacher, Mr.
Gendron, asked him why Mrs. Roselli had thrown him out of her class. 3
Mr. Gendron
then told Michael to draw a picture about how he was
4
feeling.
Feeling angry, Michael drew a picture of the school and the
Superintendent surrounded by explosives. 5 After finishing his picture,
Michael handed it to Mr. Gendron.6 When Mr. Gendron asked Michael if
he planned on carrying out what he drew, Michael said no; he was just
expressing his anger.7 On April 7, 2000, the principal called Michael into
his office and questioned him about the picture. 8 Once again, Michael
reiterated his intentions and reasons for drawing the picture. 9 On April 7,
2000, the principal suspended Michael from school and subsequently, on
May 1, 2000, the school board expelled him for the remainder of the
school year because he refused to see a psychiatrist. 10
Prior to expelling Michael, the school administration had not
analyzed Michael's present intent or ability to carry out the act1' depicted
1 Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law In Support of Temporary Restraining Order at I,
Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dep't (D. Mass. filed May 23, 2000) (No. CAOO-40082).
2 Id.

3 id.
4 id.
' Id. at 2.
6 Plaintiff's Memorandum at 2, Demers (No. CAOO-40082).
7 id.
8 id.

9 Id.
1o

Id.

1 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 275, §§ 2, 6 (2001). Section 2 states in pertinent part "if
a complaint is made to any such court or justice that a person has threatened to commit a
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in his artwork.' 2
In Michael's case, the school administrators
impermissibly abrogated his First Amendment
rights in failing to properly
3
analyze what they had perceived as a threat.'
II.STUDENT EXPRESSION IN PUBLIC SCHOOL POSTCOLUMBINE
Since the school massacres in Jonesboro, Arkansas14 in March 1998
and in Littleton, Colorado 5 in April 1999, school administrators have
dramatically increased the number of students suspended and expelled for
expressions perceived as threatening.16 Across the country, school
administrators are implementing zero-tolerance policies when confronted
with threatening behavior by students. 17
Schools are suspending,

crime against the person or property of another, such court shall examine the complainant
and any such witnesses who may be produced ...... MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 275, § 2.
Section 6 states in pertinent part, "[i]f
upon such examination, it is found that there is no
just cause to fear that such a crime will be committed by the person complained of, he shall
be forthwith discharged." MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 275, § 6.
12 Plaintiff's Memorandum at 2, Demers (No. CAOO-40082).
13 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 275, § 2.
14 See Kenneth Heard, Killer's Essay Haunts Westside Teacher, ARK. DEMOCRATGAZETTE, June 6, 1999, at Al.

On the morning of March 24, 1998, thirteen-year-old
Mitchel Johnson and eleven-year-old Andrew Golden broke into the home of Golden's
grandfather, stole rifles and handguns, and drove a van that belonged to Johnson's mother
to the woods behind their middle school. Id. Johnson hid fifty yards from the school while
Golden went into the school, pulled a fire alarm and raced back to meet Johnson. Id. As
students and teachers left the school because of the fire alarm, Golden and Johnson opened
fire, killing four students and teacher Shannon Wright. Id. Authorities believe Johnson
hoped to kill a teacher who had disciplined him in the past Id.
15 See Mark Obmascik, Bloodbath Leaves 15 Dead, 28 Hurt, DENVER POST, April
21,
1999, at Al. Eighteen-year-old Eric Harris and seventeen-year-old Dylan Klebold, seniors
at Columbine High School, were associated with a group known as the "Trench Coat
Mafia" and were known admirers of Adolf Hitler and the white supremacy movement. Id.
On April 20, 1999, the anniversary of Hitler's birthday, Harris and Klebold executed a plan
they spent a year creating. Id. Armed with guns, knives, and pipe bombs, Harris and
Klebold murdered twelve students and one teacher, wounded twenty-three students, and
ultimately killed themselves. Id.
16 See John Kass, Fear of School Violence Getting Best of Common Sense,
CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 4, 1999, at Al. In Denton County, Texas, a 13-year-old's teacher asked him to write a
"scary" Halloween story for a class assignment. Id. Following the assignment, the student
wrote a story about shooting up a school. Id. The student received an "A" for his
assignment and his teacher was so entertained by it that she asked the student to read it
aloud to the class. Id. The teacher reconsidered and determined that the story was
inappropriate and reported the student to the principal's office. Id. The police were
contacted and the child was jailed for six days before the court confirmed that the student
had not committed a crime. Id.
17 See Kim Brooks et. al., School House Hype: Two Years Later, May 31, 2000,
availableat http://www.cjcj.org/schoolhousehype.ssh2.
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expelling, and even arresting students for drawing, discussing, and
planning 8 acts of violence against their fellow classmates, teachers, and
schools.'
Over the last two years, there has been a drastic increase in
expulsions and suspensions for behavior or speech that occurs on school
grounds but is neither criminal nor violent.' 9 Over three million children
Six months after a school shooting in Edinboro, Pennsylvania, a Juvenile Court
Judge in Dauphin County issued a Memorandum regarding 'ZERO
TOLERANCE' to School Violence, and noted that the Juvenile court was
therefore adopting a 'Zero Tolerance' policy to violence or threats of violence, of
any kind, occurring in school. Under this policy, any student who commits or
threatens to commit any act of violence is to be immediately prosecuted, with
consequences being 'SERIOUS' to 'SEVERE' for the first offense and
'CATASTROPHIC' for subsequent offenses.
Kim Brooks et. al., supra. The judge also stated, "second chances would not exist for this
type of antisocial behavior." Id.
18 See Boston Schools Drop Suspension of Chain-Saw Story Teller, ASSOCIATED
May 18, 2000, at http://www.freedomforum.org/news. In April 2000, Charles
Carithers, a junior at Boston Latin Academy, wrote about a fictional student's chain-saw
attack on his English teacher. Id. Although his teacher told him that no subject was offlimits, the teacher and school administrators considered the essay "a threat to do bodily
harm" and suspended Charles for three days. Id. Following a hearing before the school
appeals board, the board overturned the suspension on May 16, 2000, finding that Charles's
essay did not constitute a threat. Id.; see also Ohio District, Student Journalist Settle
Lawsuit Over Satirical Column, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 11,
1999, at
http://www.freedomforum.org/news. On April 23, 2000, in Macedonia, Ohio, three days
after the shootings at Columbine High School, Mark Guidetti, co-editor of the school
newspaper, published a column that school administrators felt suggested violent acts
relieved stress. Id. Mark wrote: "Feel free to go commando." Id. "Administrators took
'go commando' literally; Mark said it was teenage slang for not wearing underwear." Id.
Mark was suspended from school for ten days, but because of the media attention his
suspension had received, the school allowed him to return after serving only two days of the
suspension. Id. His father filed a lawsuit with the U.S. District Court in Cleveland
accusing the school district of violating Mark's right to free speech. Id. On November 5,
1999, Mark received $18,500 to settle his lawsuit. Id.; see also Student suspended for
doodles sues Louisiana School District, ASSOCIATED PRESS, August 22, 2000, at
http://www.freedomforum.org.html. In February 2000, Daniel Allen was suspended from
Haughton High School in Louisiana after school officials confiscated papers containing his
doodles and drawings. Id. The school claimed that some of Allen's doodles represented
gang symbols or white supremacy slogans, and that Allen repeatedly outlined his signature
with the shape of a gun. Id. Allen brought an action claiming that the school violated his
First Amendment rights. Id. Allen claimed his drawings related to music lyrics, were not
intended to convey violent messages, and that the lines around his signature were just lines.
Id.
19 See Brooks et. al., supra note 17, at 12. Although national statistics exist, a look to
individual states is more demonstrative of what is occurring across the country. Id.
Suspension and expulsion data is collected by the Maryland State Department of Education
in order to provide insight into the "nature and scale of the problem." Id. (citing INFO.
MGMT. BRANCH: MD. STATE DEP'T OF EDUC., SUSPENSIONS FROM MARYLAND PUBLIC
SCHOOLS (2000)).

PRESS,
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are suspended or expelled in a given year. 20 National research suggests
that the largest number of suspensions have been for expression and acts
not involving violence.2
As schools across the country react to the Columbine killings with
zero tolerance policies for any student expression perceived as threatening,
some courts are reminding administrators that public school students do
have free speech rights.22 School administrators are excluding students for
their expressions in drawings, writings, artwork, or interpersonal speech
that the administrators "perceive" as threatening because of the
countervailing public interest in the security of educational settings. This
Note proposes that the First Amendment rights of public school students
across the country are being violated when students are suspended or

The total percentage of students who were expelled or suspended did decline
between school years 1997-1998 and 1998-1999 (from 9.1% to 7.8%), but the
number of suspensions issued for non-violent acts increased from the previous
year. Suspensions for physical attacks on students were down 13.0%, and firearm
possession suspensions and expulsions were down 49.2% but suspensions for
false alarm/bomb threats were up 44.2%.
Brooks et. al., supra note 17, at 12 (citing
EDUC.,

INFO. MGMT. BRANCH: MD. STATE DEP'T OF
SUSPENSIONS FROM MARYLAND PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2000)).
The number of

expulsions in Massachusetts increased by 35.0% between school years 1993-94 (958
students) and 1996-97 (1498 students). Brooks et. al., supra note 17, at 12 (citing 19961997 MALDEN, MASSACHUSETTS:
DEP'T.
MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC SCHOOL (1996-1997))

OF EDUC.:

STUDENT

EXCLUSION

IN

After possession of weapons and illegal substances, youth in Massachusetts'
schools were most often expelled for 'other' non-violent unenumerated offenses..
• . Like Maryland, Massachusetts' largest city, Boston, had one of the lowest
expulsion rates (1.7 per 1000 students), and only the third-highest total number of
expulsions (109). By contrast, the City of Springfield had 399 expulsions with a
rate of 16.8 per 1,000 students--nearly ten times the Boston rate. In total, sixteen
other school districts in Massachusetts had higher expulsion rates than Boston.
With suburban and smaller district expulsion rates outstripping the state's largest
urban area, such rates clearly have little to do with overall juvenile crime rates.
Brooks et. al., supra note 17, at 12 (citing 1996-1997 MALDEN, MASSACHUSETTS: DEP'T.
OF EDUC.: STUDENT EXCLUSION IN MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC SCHOOL (1996-1997)).

See Brooks et. al., supra note 17, at 12.
See id.
22 See, e.g., Boman v. Bluestem Unified Sch. Dist. No. 205, No. 00-1034-WEB, 2000
WL 297167 (D. Kan. 2000) (holding school violated student's First Amendment rights by
expelling her for posting artwork on wall); Order Granting Plaintiffs Summary Judgment
Motion and Denying Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion, LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist.,
No. C99-1074 (W.D. Wash. filed Feb. 24, 2000) (holding school authorities wrong by
expelling student who wrote poem depicting massacre in school); Ohio District, Student
Journalist Settle Lawsuit Over Satirical Column, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 11, 1999, at
http://www.freedomforum.org/news (noting Cleveland court's finding suspension violated
student's First Amendment rights).
20
21
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expelled prior to an assessment of the perceived threat. 23 This Note will
highlight the history of a student's First Amendment rights in the
educational setting and will analyze, in a Post-Columbine light, the effect
the climate of fear has placed on a student's First Amendment rights.
Moreover, the Note will propose a two-prong analysis of student
expression prior to the imposition of school exclusion. In discussing the
two-prong analysis, the Note will focus on the Massachusetts threat statute
and the Supreme Judicial Court's recent decision in Commonwealth v.
24
Milo.
III. STUDENT EXPRESSION AND THE LAW
According to the Supreme Court, "education is the most important
function of state and local governments," and "suspension or expulsion is a
serious event in the life of the suspended or expelled child. '25 For over
forty years, the Supreme Court has held that First Amendment rights are
available to teachers and students in a school environment.2 6 Students do
not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate. '27 Concomitantly, the Court has affirmed the
inherent authority of the States and school administrators to establish and
enforce rules of permissible conduct within an educational setting
consistent with constitutional principles.28 When students exercise their
First Amendment rights, conflicts may arise with the policies of school
authorities.2 9
When grappling with a student's expression that does not intrude
ostensibly upon the school's operation or the rights of other students, the
Court has held that forbidden conduct must "materially and substantially
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of
the school" or "collide with the rights of others. ' 30 An administrator's
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
433 Mass. 249, 740 N.E.2d 967 (2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 275, § 2, 6 (2001).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Goss v. Lopez, 418 U.S. 565,
576 (1975).
26 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969)
23
24
25

(holding school officials violated students' First Amendment rights by suspending them for
wearing armbands to protest Vietnam). The Court held that student expression is
constitutionally protected unless school officials have a reasonable belief that the
expression will cause a substantial disruption of the school environment. Id. at 514.
27 Id. at 506; see also West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (holding students in public schools not compelled to salute the flag under First
Amendment).
28 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
29 Id.

30 Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966) (enjoining high school
authorities from enforcing regulation that forebode students from wearing freedom buttons).
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foreboding pandemonium cannot trump a student's freedom of speech.31
The Constitution protects student speech that incites an argument, sparks a
protest, or causes a disturbance, purveying the principle that the benefits of
expression outweigh the risks of suppression.32 School authorities cannot
stifle or prohibit the expression of a student's opinion based
on a wish to
33
avoid controversy that may result from such expression.
The Court opines that a student should be taught constitutional
freedom by example. 34 There is no better laboratory in which to
experiment with the models of expression than within the safe environs of
the classroom. 35 Here, the thought processes given rise to expression may
be challenged, analyzed, and tested in robust debate.36 Based on this
reasoning, school officials should not have absolute authority over their
students.37 In the school environs, students are not merely receptors of the
State's message; their education encourages them to challenge, analyze,
and test the message and to express their own message.38 Administrators
cannot confine students to only officially approved expressions.39 Students
are entitled to freedom of expression of their views unless school officials
show a constitutionally valid reason for the regulation of speech. 40 School
officials cannot conduct their schools so as to "foster a homogenous
people."' 41 The Court upholds a student's right to engage in non-disruptive
expression but distinguishes speech or actions that intrude upon the work
31 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (criticizing court's conclusion school authorities' acted
upon reasonable fear of disturbance from wearing armbands).
32 Id. at 508 (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)).

" Id. at 515 (White, J.,concurring) (noting "distinction between communicating by
words, acts or conduct significantly impinging on some valid state interest").
34 See id. at 512 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 480 (1960)) (reasoning
classroom is the "marketplace of ideas").
35 See Tinker, at 512.
36 Id. at 512.
37 Id. at 511; see also Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 690 (1986) (Brennan,
J.,
concurring) (concluding school officials do not have limitless authority or discretion in
apply ng notions of indecency).
8 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511; see also Fraser, 478 U.S. at 690 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). The dissent recognized that the school administration "must be given wide
latitude in determining forms of conduct inconsistent with school's educational purpose, but
Justice Marshall argued that where speech is concerned we cannot unquestioningly accept
teacher's or administrator's assertion that certain pure speech interferes with education."
Id.
39 See, e.g., Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511; Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260, 289 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (reasoning using "yardstick" less than Tinker test
results in school curtailing speech at slightest disturbance); Shanley v. Northeast Indep.
Sch. Dist. Bexar Cty. Tex., 462 F.2d 960, 972 (5th Cir. 1972) (indicating need to teach
children Constitution "living reality, not 'parchment' preserved under glass").
40 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511; see also Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 287 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing speech left uncensored by school administrators because speech
addresses topics deemed potentially sensitive).
41 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923).
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of the schools or the rights of the students.42 When school expression
obstructs the State's duty to teach or thwarts a student's right to learn the
lessons the State seeks to teach, school administrators may take measured
control to ensure that learning proceeds. 43
IV. CHARACTERIZING STUDENT SPEECH
The Court distinguished the First Amendment's requirement that a
school tolerate a particular student's speech from the promotion of that
student's speech. 44 The Court allows schools greater deference in their
decisions to censor a school-sponsored publication inasmuch as there is a
"valid, articulable, educational purpose. '45 Judicial intervention is required
to protect students' constitutional rights if the regulation is not reasonable
and is not based on legitimate pedagogical concerns. 46
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question of whether
school officials can punish students for advocating violence or other
unlawful conduct.4 7 Moreover, the Court has not established the extent of
42

See Fraser,478 U.S. at 680. The Court held that the school district did not violate

First Amendment rights of a high school student when the school imposed a two-day
suspension on him for giving a lewd speech at a school assembly. Id. at 685. The Court
concluded that it was "appropriate for the school to disassociate itself from the student to
make the point to the pupils that vulgar and lewd conduct is inconsistent with the
'fundamental values' of public school education." Id. at 685.
43 See id. at 681.
44 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 260. The Court held that the standard for determining
when a school may punish student expression occurring on school premises is not the
standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend its name and resources to
dissemination of student expression. Id. at 271. The Court held that the school did not
violate the First Amendment rights of students when they exercised editorial control over
the style and content of the student's speech in the school newspaper. Id. The Court
concluded that educators "can exercise greater control" over school-sponsored activities in
order to ensure that the readers or listeners learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to
teach, and that "the views of the individual speaker are not attributed to the school." Id.
45 See id. at 273.
46 See id. "Education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of parents,
teachers, and state and local school officials." Id. "But when the decision to censor a
school-sponsored publication or other vehicle of student expression has no valid
educational purpose," federal judges share a role in the responsibility of protecting students'
constitutional rights.
Id. Student's free expression oftentimes interferes with the
effectiveness of the school's pedagogical function. Id. at 280 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "If
mere incompatibility with the school's pedagogical message is constitutionally sufficient
justification for censoring student expression," school officials could suppress any student
expression that offends them. Id. School officials should not act as "thought police"
assessing those topics and viewpoint that should be censored. Id. at 284.
47 See Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 686 F. Supp. 1387, 1393 (D. Minn. 1987). First
Amendment case pre-Columbine in which the district court wrestled with a student's First
Amendment rights in educational setting. Id. The court only had Tinker, Bethel and
Hazelwood to rely on as precedent. Id.
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a student's First Amendment rights in the context of drawings, artwork, or
interpersonal speech that is perceived as threatening. 48 As a result, lower
courts wrestle with the standard of acceptable expression versus
unacceptable expression in a school environment. 49 Particularly since
Columbine, the lower courts disagree about the amount of discretion
allotted to school administrators in proscribing and disciplining a student's
perceived threatening speech.5 °
In addressing the issue of whether school administrators are
trampling upon a student's First Amendment rights, the lower courts assess
the factual circumstances in which the student's expression occurred. 51
Relying on the test established in Tinker, the lower courts reasoned that a
student's speech should be protected, even if it is unpopular, provided it
does not substantially interfere with the mission of the school.52
Suspending or expelling a student based on either fear, perception of
disruption, or interference with school discipline is53never an acceptable
justification for limiting student speech under Tinker.
48 See, e.g., Boman, 2000 WL 297167, at *4 (holding student's First Amendment
rights violated when student expelled for posting artwork on school wall); LaVine, No.
C99-1074 at 8 (holding school authorities wrong to expel junior who wrote poem depicting
school massacre); State Appeals Court: First Amendment Doesn't Protect Boy's Essay,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 5, 2000, at http://www.freedomforum.org/news (ruling essay
eighth-grade boy wrote about an upset student beheading teacher not protected by First
Amendment).
49 See id.
50 See id.
51 See LaVine, No. C99-1074 at 2. In October 1998, school officials expelled
LaVine, an eleventh grade student, for writing a poem entitled "Last Words." Id at 2. The
student's poem, "a first person account of a student who kills numerous classmates and then
anguishes over his deeds," was not an assigned project, but rather an extracurricular activity
by LaVine. Id. Ironically, the school expelled LaVine after a licensed psychologist and the
local Sheriff's department investigated the writing and informed the school that LaVine was
not an immediate threat. Id. at 3. The court held that poetry fell within "the core speech
protected by the Constitution under the First Amendment." Id. at 6. In reaching the
conclusion that the school district did not act reasonably, the district court reviewed the
poem in light of the factual circumstances that existed in October 1998. Id. at 8. The court
reasoned that there was "no overt act, violent demeanor or other threatening behavior
manifested by LaVine" and pointed out that his teacher was not concerned about anyone's
safety ; rather she was only concerned for LaVine's well-being. Id. at 9.
Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp.2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo.
1998). The court granted a preliminary injunction to a high school student who claimed his
rights under the First Amendment were violated when the school district suspended him for
ten days for posting a homepage on the Internet that was critical of the high school and
included crude and vulgar language. Id. at 1177. The court reasoned that the student's
homepage did not "materially or substantially interfere with school discipline." Id. at 1180
(citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509). Further, there was no evidence to support a reasonable fear
of such interference. Id. The court enjoined the school from restricting the student's "use
of his home computer to repost his homepage" and also from enforcing any sanctions
arising from the student's homepage. Id. at 1182.
3 Id. at 1180.
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Public school students are not a suspect class under the Equal
Protection Clause.54 Where there is a legitimate government interest, a
school may ban specific expression without eviscerating constitutional
principles.55 Lower courts differ, however, as to the application of this
analysis.56 While courts acknowledge that school administrators have a
compelling interest in ensuring the safety of the students and staff, some
courts have concluded that an administrator's actions must be sufficiently
refined to achieve their permissible goals while not infringing on First
Amendment freedom of speech.57
The courts are aware of the extreme concern for student safety in
the wake of recentepisodes of violence throughout the country. 58 Upon
learning of a specific threat, administrators have not only a right, but also a
duty to investigate the pupil and the peril.5 9 While the school district
understandably wants to be certain that no actual threat to student safety
exists, lower courts conclude that the school official should thoroughly
investigate the threats prior to the long-term suspension or expulsion of a
student. 6°
54 West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1365 (10th Cir. 2000).
55 Id. As a result of racial tensions in the school district, the school had reason to
believe that "a student's display of Confederate flag might cause disruption and interfere
with rights of other students to be secure and left alone." Id.
5 See id. at 1365 (holding "rationally related to legitimate governmental purpose"
sufficient). Compare LaVine, No. C99-1074 at 8 (reasoning school cannot preemptively
silence student unless reasonable person would conclude poem constitutes threat of
violence).
57 See LaVine, No. C99-1074 at 10, 11 (concluding even if concerns about
poem
reasonable, less restrictive ways of ensuring school's safety besides emergency expulsion).
58 See Elissa Haney, Lessons in Violence: A Timeline of Recent Shootings, June 14,
2000, availableat http://www.infoplease.com/spot/schoolviolencel. On February 2, 1996,
in Moses Lake, Washington fourteen-year-old Barry Loukaitis killed two students and one
teacher in his algebra class. Id. On February 19, 1997, in Bethel, Alaska, Evan Ramsey, a
sixteen-year-old boy, killed his principal and one student at his high school. Id. On
December 1, 1997, in West Paducah, Kentucky, "as students participated in a prayer circle
at Heath High School," a fourteen-year-old boy killed three students and wounded five. Id.
On April 24, 1998, in Edinboro, Pennsylvania at James W. Parker Middle School, a
fourteen-year-old boy killed one teacher and wounded two students at a dance. Id. On May
21, 1998, in Springfield, Oregon at Thurston High School, a fifteen-year-old Kip Kinkel
killed two students and wounded twenty-two others in the cafeteria. See Elissa Haney,
Lessons in Violence: A Timeline of Recent Shootings, June 14, 2000, available at
http://www.infoplease.com/spot/schoolviolencel. A day earlier, school officials discovered
that Kinkel had a gun at school. Id. Kinkel was arrested for possession of a gun at school.
Id. The police released him into his parents' custody and his parents were later found dead
at home. Id.
59 Boman, 2000 WL 297167, at *4; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507.
60 See Boman, 2000 WL 297167, at *1. In January 2000, school administrators
suspended Boman, a senior in high school, for five-days and subsequently suspended her
for the rest of the school year for creating a poster while at school and then hanging it in the
doorway. Id. The poster contained questions and statements written in first person, asking
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V. APPLICATION OF MENS REA AND THE CURRENT STATE OF
MASSACHUSETTS' LAW
Two fundamental factual questions must be addressed with regard
to student speech in the course of artwork, classroom writing assignments,
and expressions. 6' First, the fundamental question involves the intent and
state of mind of the student while creating the disputed writing.62 The
second and independent question is whether the student's conduct
substantially disrupts the operation of the school or invades the rights of
others.63

Chapter 275 of the Massachusetts General Laws requires two
elements to establish a threat against the person or property of another: (1)
an expression of intention to carry out the threat on another and (2) an
ability to do so in circumstances that would justify apprehension on the
part of the recipient of the threat. 64 The statute further states, "[i]f, upon
such examination, it is found that there is not just cause to fear that such
crime will be committed by the person complained of, he shall be forthwith
discharged. ' 65 Only when the elements of intention and ability are met "is
there 'just cause' to fear that such crime will be committed by the person
complained of."66 The Massachusetts' Courts have required
that the fear
67
of the threat be tested objectively rather than subjectively.
In an educational setting, a student who expresses a threat deserves
no less than this two-prong analysis prior to the imposition of discipline.68
A student's expression ought to be analyzed to assess both the present
intent and the ability to carry out the threat. 69 Based on a survey of the
"who killed my dog?" and asking what do "you" know about it. Id. It included statements
that "I'll kill you if you don't tell me who killed my dog" and "I'll kill you all!" Id. The
court granted the student a preliminary injunction, which was made permanent, reasoning
that the school district did not demonstrate any evidence that suggested that the student
acted with "a bad or willful purpose." Id. at *3. The court also reasoned that the student
was able to justify the context of her poster and that there was "no factual basis for
believing that she threatened to harm other students or that her return to school would
constitute a threat." Id. at *4.
61 See id. at *3-4.
62 See id.
63 See Fraser,478 U.S. at 680.
64 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 275,
65 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 275,

§§ 2, 6 (2001).
§ 6.

66 Robinson v. Bradley, 300 F. Supp. 665, 668-69 (D. Mass. 1969).
67

See Commonwealth v. Milo, 433 Mass. 149, 740 N.E.2d 967 (2001) (citing

Commonwealth v. Sholley, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 495, 497, 739 N.E.2d 236 (2000)) (noting
lower court judge tested threat objectively); see also Commonwealth v. Strahan, 39 Mass.
App. Ct. 928, 930, 657 N.E.2d 234 (1995) (holding threat assessed by determining whether
defendant's statements reasonably caused apprehension).
68 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 275, §§ 2, 6.
69 See Boman, 2000 WL 297167, at *1.

2002]

PROTECTING STUDENT SPEECH

reported cases, it appears that the second element, present ability to carry
out the threat, would substantially eliminate most of the cases of
suspensions and expulsions occurring in school districts across the
country.7 0 Failure to establish a two-prong test has resulted in a number of
students being excluded from school for expressions
that they had neither
7

the present intention nor the ability to carry out. '
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (SJC) in
Commonwealth v. Milo 72 applied a two-prong analysis in upholding a
lower court's ruling that a drawing depicting a student pointing a gun at his
teacher constitutes a threat.73 In applying the analysis, however, the SJC
did not apply an qbjective standard in determining whether a threat to
commit a crime occurred.74 Although the drawing may have appeared to
be offensive, there was no direct evidence in the drawing or presented at
trial of the juvenile's present ability or intention to commit the alleged
threatened crime.75 At trial, the teacher testified that she did not want the
70

See id. at *4; see also LaVine, No. C99-1074 at 8-9.

71 See Plaintiffs Memorandum at 2, Demers (No. CA00-40082); Ted Flanagan,

Parents Not Told of Pupil's Threat: Event Didn't Cause Real Concern, WORCESTER
TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, June 17, 2000, at A2. During the week of June 12, 2000, a fifthgrader threatened to shoot his classmates on the last day of school. Id. Although an
investigation by school administrators demonstrated that the threat would not be carried out,
the student was suspended in order to send a message to the student and his classmates. Id.
Therefore, they suspended the boy for the last two days of school. Id.
72 433 Mass. 149, 740 N.E.2d at 967. In Milo, a twelve-year-old juvenile sat outside
his classroom waiting to be disciplined by the principal. Id. at 150, 740 N.E.2d at 968.
Sitting there, the juvenile drew two pictures. Id. The first picture depicted the juvenile
shooting Mrs. F., his teacher. Id. A teacher confiscated this picture and showed it to Mrs.
F. Id. The juvenile then drew a second picture and brought it to Mrs. F.'s classroom. Id.
The juvenile stood in the doorway with the second picture, which depicted the juvenile
pointing a gun at Mrs. F, and "said in a defiant tone," "[D]o you want this one tooT' Id.
Mrs. F. was unable to see the drawing, but because she did not want the juvenile to
approach her, she told him to give the drawing to one of his classmates. Milo, 433 Mass.
150, 740 N.E.2d at 968. The juvenile's classmate handed the picture to Mrs. F. Id.
73 See id. at 152, 740 N.E.2d at 970. The SJC held that the juvenile court judge's
finding that "it was reasonable to fear that the [juvenile] had the intention and ability to
carry out the threat" did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice in the
absence of any other references to an objective standard. Id. The SJC also concluded that
there was enough evidence to support the judge's findings that the "juvenile expressed an
intent to commit the threatened crime" and an ability to do so in certain circumstances that
would justify apprehension on the part of the juvenile's teacher. Id. at 154, 740 N.E.2d at
972.
74 See Robinson v. Bradley, 300 F. Supp. 665, 668 (D. Mass. 1969); Commonwealth
v. Ditsch, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 1005, 475 N.E.2d 1235 (1985) (holding legal interpretation of
threat requires more than mere expression of intention). A threat has been interpreted to
require "both the intention and ability in circumstances which would justify apprehension
on thepart of the recipient of the threat." Id.
75Milo, at 156, 740 N.E.2d at 973. The SJC concluded that there was no direct
evidence that the juvenile possessed an immediate ability to carry out the threat at the time
he communicated the drawing to Mrs F. [his teacher], however the court reasoned that did
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juvenile to approach her, yet she "prefer[ed] he give this picture [second
picture] to this girl who would then give it to me."' 76 Arguably, even if the
alleged threat was directed toward her, if the teacher truly felt frightened of
the juvenile's ability and intention to commit the crime, the teacher would77
not have placed the risk on a twelve-year-old student in her classroom.
Actually, the teacher testified, "I couldn't really see it," in reference to the
drawing that the juvenile had shown to her.78
The juvenile's second drawing did not constitute a threat because
the threat could not have been communicated. 79 Rather than being a
substantive communication of intent to perform the act depicted, the
juvenile's drawing expressed his anger.80 By holding otherwise, the SJC's
"not mean that [the juvenile] could not have carried out his threat at a later time." Id.
76

See Defendant's Corrected Brief at 17, Commonwealth v. Milo, 433 Mass. 149,

749 N.E.2d 967 (May 5, 2000) (No. SJC-08269).
77 See Milo, at 150, 740 N.E.2d at 969; Commonwealth v.Gordon, 44 Mass. App. Ct.
233, 236, 694 N.E.2d 2, 4 (1998) (reasoning threats are "acts or language by which another
is placed in fear of injury or damage"); see also Defendant's Brief at 17, Milo, (No. SJC08269).
78 See Milo, at 150, 740 N.E.2d at 969.
79 See id. at 151 n. 2, 740 N.E.2d at 970 (noting lower court found first drawing not
threat because never communicated by juvenile). The juvenile walked into his teacher's
classroom and asked, "Do you want this one, too?" in reference to his second drawing. See
Milo, at 150, 740 N.E.2d at 969. From where she was standing, the teacher was unable to
see what the picture depicted, so she told one of the juvenile's classmates to take the
drawing from the juvenile and bring it to her. Id. The juvenile handed the picture to his
classmate and left his teacher's classroom without any "further verbalization or unusual
conduct." Defendant's Brief at 4, Milo, (No. SJC-08269). At trial, the Commonwealth's
only [emphasis added] witness was the teacher who testified that she felt apprehensive and
characterized the juvenile as having spoken to her in a defiant manner when he asked her,
"Do you want this one, too?" Id.; see also Commonwealth v. DeVincent, 358 Mass. 592,
595, 266 N.E.2d 314, 316 (1971) (stating "the state of mind of person threatened is not
controlling"). Arguably, in Milo, the Juvenile Court focused on the subjective state of mind
of the juvenile's teacher in stating, "it was reasonable to fear that the Defendant had the
intention and the ability to carry out the threat." Milo, at 150, 740 N.E.2d at 969 (quoting
Juvenile Court judge's finding and noting correct application of the law). Moreover, in the
SJC's decision in Milo, the court relies on merely circumstantial evidence in determining
that the juvenile had the ability to commit this crime. See Milo, at 155, 740 N.E.2d at 972.
The only evidence the SJC relies on are the following facts: (1) the drawings were violent
and according to the juvenile's teacher were held out in "an angry and defiant manner;" (2)
the juvenile was sitting in the hallway, which "usually [means] [the student] had done
something to cause that situation;" (3) the juvenile was loitering near the teacher's car later
that same day; (4) and the court's taking judicial notice of recently highly publicized,
school-related shootings by students. id. at 155-157, 740 N.E.2d 973-974. From these facts
alone [emphasis added], the SJC concludes that in light of the" 'climate of apprehension' "
concerning school violence in which this incident occurred, the teacher's fear that the
juvenile could carry out the threat was quite reasonable and justified." Id. at 157, 740
N.E.2d at 974 (citing Sholley, 432 Mass. at 726, 739 N.E.2d 236 (2000)).
80 See MASS. GEN. LAWS Const. Pt. 1,Art. XVI (2001) which provides: "[T]he right
of free speech shall not be abridged." See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 82 (2000) which
states: "[T]he right of students to freedom of expression in the public schools of the

2002]

PROTECTING STUDENT SPEECH

decision causes a chilling effect on the exercise of the juvenile's First
Amendment rights.8'
VI. CONCLUSION
The SJC's decision sets an unenforceable and dangerous precedent
for juveniles in Massachusetts. 82 Although a student's drawing may
succeed in offending his teacher, a drawing cannot objectively be said to
be a threat to commit a crime. 83 There needs to be something more to
commonwealth shall norbe abridged, provided that such right shall not cause any disruption
or disorder within the school. Freedom of expression shall include without limitation, the
rights and responsibilities of students, collectively and individually, (a) to express their
views through speech and symbols, (b) to write, publish and disseminate their views ......
Id. The drawing does not depict an act of violence that rises to the level of a threat; rather
arguably the drawing is a form of expression. Id.The picture at issue depicts a teacher
smiling while the juvenile is pointing with what appears to be a toy gun at her. See Milo, at
161, 740 N.E.2d at 977 (Appendix B). Although the drawing may arguably appear to be
offensive, no direct evidence was presented at trial of the juvenile's present ability to
commit the alleged threatened crime. See, e.g., Milo, at 156, 740 N.E.2d at 973; Boman,
2000 WL 297167, at *4; LaVine, No. C99-1074 at 8-9; see also Defendant's Brief at 14,
Milo, (No. SJC-08269). Moreover, the drawing must be looked at in the context in which it
was written. Arguably, the student was angry. The juvenile was sitting in the hallway for
disciplinary issues that had arisen the previous day. See Milo, at 150, 740 N.E.2d at 969.
See also Eileen McNamara, Frightof Fancy was Misjudged, THE BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE,
Apr. 30, 2000, at Bl. "It's quite a leap from creative writing to criminal design, even for
those who find [themselves spending] these perilous times in America's classrooms." Id.
81 U.S. CONST. amend. I
82

See Commonwealth v. A. Juvenile, 368 Mass 580, 334 N.E.2d 617 (1975) (holding

Massachusetts's threat statute should be reviewed under strict scrutiny standard); see also
Fogelman v. Chatman, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 585, 590 n. 4, 446 N.E.2d 1112 (1983) (citing
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, at 586 n.4, 334 N.E.2d at 621-22 (1975)) (holding courts
should resolve ambiguities in statute in favor of holding it unconstitutional). The Fogelman
court reasoned that holding a law unconstitutional would prevent the statute from having a
"deterrent or chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights due to the threat of
the statute's possible application." Id.; see also Supreme Judicial Court reviews drawing,
WORCESTER TELEGRAM AND GAZETTE, Nov. 29, 2000 at Bl. Chief Justice Marshall of the
SJC actually stated during the Milo case, "statistics show schools are among the safest
places for children. There are thousands of schools where shootings have never taken
place." Id.
83 See Commonwealth v. A. Juvenile, at 589-590, 334 N.E.2d at 623-624
(quoting
Colder v. California 403 U.S. 15, 23 (1971) stating "[vulgar, profane, offensive, or abusive
speech is not, without more, subject to criminal sanction"); see also Commonwealth v.
Sholley,48 Mass. App. Ct. 495, 497, 739 Mass. N.E.2d 415, 418 (quoting Commonwealth
v. Elliffe, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 580, 582, 714 N.E.2d 835, 837 (1999)). Drawings and words
"must be interpreted in the context of the actions and demeanor which accompanied them."
Id.; see also Lisa Pisciotta, Comment, Beyond Sticks and Stones: A First Amendment
Framework For Educators Who Seek to Punish Student Threats, 30 SETON HALL L. REV.
635 (2000). In determining whether to punish a threat of violence, school officials must
consider "within which what context or circumstances was the student threat uttered? ...
[and] what was the reaction of the person to whom the threat was directed, and if the
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transform the drawing from offensive speech to a threat to commit a
crime. 84
School shootings have generated a climate of fear, but that fear does
not provide a rational basis for curtailing a student's First Amendment
rights or excluding them from education. 85 A student's drawings and
words "must be interpreted in the context of the actions and demeanor
which accompanied them. ' 86 First Amendment issues involving students
that are being brought into the justice system, could be, and have
previously been, handled by school administrators.87 To avoid the courts
being further enmeshed in the administration of the nation's schools,
school administrators should be guided by the two-prong analysis:
the
88
student's present intent and present ability to act upon the threat.
Michael Demers would not have been expelled for drawing on April
7, 2000 had Northwest School utilized a two-prong analysis prior to
reaction was fear, was that fear a reasonable and foreseeable reaction?" Id.; see also MASS
GEN LAWS ch. 71, § 82.
84 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508; LaVine, No. C99-1074 at 8-9; see also Eileen
McNamara, Fright of Fancy was Misjudged, THE BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2000,
at B I.
85 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508; see also In re B.R., 732 A.2d 633, 639 (1999). The
court stated that a threat by a student to bring a gun to school can "in no way be treated as a
joking statement which can be casually disregarded." Id. However, the statement or
arguably the school's belief that an inference is being made by a drawing must be assessed
prior to the student's suspension or expulsion. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. "Acting with a
conscious disregard for a student's First Amendment rights and his right to an education
violates a student's constitutional rights." Id.
86 Sholley, at 497, 726 Mass. N.E.2d at 218 (quoting Elliffe, at 582, 714 N.E.2d at
837).
87

See Brooks, supra note 17, at 20-22; see also DEPARTMENT

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: THE SCHOOL SHOOTER: A
available at http://www.resultsproject.net/FBl_.Report

OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF

THREAT ASSESSMENT PERSPECTIVE,

(discussing use of systematic

procedure for threat assessment and intervention); see also
ATIrORNEY:

AFTER

CHICAGO

COLUMBINE

To

PARTICIPATE IN

MOSAIC-2000

SHOOTINGS,

January

12,

COOK COUNTY STATE'S
PILOT PROGRAM: DEVELOPED

2000,

available

at

http://www.statesattorney.org/aweb/presmosa.
According to Cook County State's
Attorney's Office in Chicago, MOSAIC-2000 provides a step-by-step evaluation on a
computer of a student's threat. Id. This adds another component to violence prevention
and potentially enables a young, non-violent offender to be diverted out of the court system.
Id. See also Scott Greenberger, Threat Led School to STARS, THE BOSTON GLOBE, April 4,
2000 (discussing analyzing threats and manner in which to respond). In the wake of
Columbine shooting, Massachusetts police departments have devised a proactive approach
to school violence. Id. STARS-School Threat Assessment Response System has a team of
law enforcement, school officials and mental health specialists ready to respond when a
school crisis cannot be handled through normal channels. Id. The System is supported by
State funding and is used to analyze threats rather than just react to them, thereby, "keeping
education from grinding to a halt." Id.; but see John Kass, Now, a High-Tech Witch Hunt
For 'Dangerous' Students, at http://www.freedomforum.org (questioning and criticizing
reliability of Mosaic-2000 and intrusion Program has on students).
88 See Boman, 2000 WL 297167, at *4; see also LaVine, No. C99-1074 at 8-9.
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acting. 89 Michael unequivocally stated that yes, he was angry, but no, he
did not have the intention or the ability to carry out the act he drew on
paper. 90 On June 5th, the school allowed Michael to re-enter Northwest
School and gave him permission to attend graduation with his classmates. 9'
The Northwest School administrators may have believed that by
suspending Michael they were acting in the best interest of the school in
protecting the safety of their students. The school's decision appears,
92
however, to have been made without rationally assessing the threat.
Administrators violated Michael's First Amendment rights with the full
knowledge that Michael had neither the intention nor the ability to carry
out the act.93
In the wake of school violence across the country, schools, such as
the facility in Milo, are justified in being concerned for the safety of their
student body, but the subjective fear or apprehension of a teacher or
administrator is not sufficient to curtail a student's First Amendment
rights. Closing the doors of an educational facility to a student by
disciplining or punishing his expression prior to analyzing the
circumstances under which the student expression occurred is not
consistent with the goal of education or the First Amendment. In future
cases, Massachusetts' schools must assiduously ensure the safety of their
schools and scrupulously safeguard the constitutional rights of their
students.
Kathryn E. Mcntyre

89

See Plaintiffs Memorandum at 2, Demers (No. CAOO-40082).

90 See id.

91 See Matt Brun, Ousted Pupil to Return to School, Leominster Oks Attendance,
Tutor, WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETrE, June 3, 2000, at A2.
92

See Plaintiff's Memorandum at 2, Demers (No. CAOO-40082).

93 See id.

